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Conclusion

Stability in revolution

The right of revolution is the obverse of the duty of obedience;
the explanation of revolution the obverse of the explanation of
stability.'

Repeated mass violence directed against the institutions and personnel
of the established church, armed insurrection designed to topple the
existing government, experiments with new political and religious forms
- all this and much more suggests that the Dutch Revolt lends itself well
to analysis informed by the scholarship on collective action. To be sure,
this literature was developed to explain change by investigation of the
behavior of determinate groups in pursuit of common goals. But for the
reasons alluded to in Freeman’s observation just quoted, it can also help
the student of stability account for the weakness or absence of such
behavior. What follows draws upon this body of concepts, first to identify
the critical factors inhibiting collective action in Lille, and then to spec
ify the conditions that fostered it in other cities.^
Before examining the various urban histories, it will be useful to
define and briefly outline the elements in collective action analysis rele
vant to this study. Common interests are the basis on which groups form to
take action. They may be oriented either toward gaining new benefits or
toward defending long-accepted rights and privileges. Organization is
the process of increasing the common identity - the consciousness > Michael Freeman, “Review Article: Theories of Revolution,” British Journal ofPolitical Science 2
(i972):339.

2 I have found most helpful Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, and Rod Aya, “Theories of
Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence,” Theory and Society 8

(i979):i-38.
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and unifying structure among members of a group so it can act on its
interests. Through mobilization, a group comes to control resources that
will enable it to implement its members’ common interests. Opportunities
or threats are perceptions by groups that encourage or impel them to act,
whereas facilitation and repression, measures taken by those in power,
contribute to or prevent groups from acting.
Social relations arising from economic pursuits often create common
interests, consciousness, and structures. But scholars of collective action
argue that interest groups also form on the basis of religion, politics,
residence - anything, in short, that generates both a shared situation
perceived as such by its protagonists and a shared understanding of
rights and responsibilities that mandate action. Thus collective action is
frequendy - and most successfully - undertaken not by single groups
but by coalitions. In these alliances, the links among groups powerfully
affect the ways in which common interests are construed and articulated,
the forms of organization devised, the possibilities for mobilizing, and
the environment in which any undertaking occurs.
Fissures within the existing government are crucial for the develop
ment of all components of collective action. Splits of this sort can, in
particular, lead to alliances between contenders and a faction of the
government; they can make the authorities unwilling or unable to use
sufficient force to crush challenges; or they can be accompanied by the .
breakdown of normal forms of legitimation. Any manner of specific
issue can provoke such breaches. But they are often grounded in social
and economic change, and this at the same time tends to weaken the
controls that help preserve the existing order in normal times. Finally,
collective action is not, according to most scholars, predicated upon the
existence of conscious revolutionary groups pursuing new or expanded
interests. On the contrary, an intent to implement forward-looking radi
cal change is rarely present at, nor is it necessary for, the outbreak of
revolt. Much more common are conservative, reactive, defensive move
ments. Typically, they aim to protect existing interests against changes
caused or condoned by the political authorities.
I
The policing measures taken by successive Magistrats and governors in
response to immediate crises have understandably loomed large in Part
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Stability in revolution
Two, where the atypicality and weakness of viable collective action has
been a dominant theme of the analysis. These steps were successful in
stabilizing Lille during the revolt, however, only because of arrange
ments - examined in Part One - that had been instituted over the
previous decades and elaborated as needed thereafter. Begun piecemeal
in response to currently pressing needs and demands, over time these
arrangements came to constitute the crucial elements of a social and
political order that served to dampen rather than promote disruption
and rebellion. They did not, of course, predetermine the city’s behavior,
but they endowed Lille with a structural tendency to stability. Not only
was there little pressure for religious or political change, but movements
that did emerge lacked effective means for realizing their objectives. In
particular, artisans and Protestants, who mounted significant challenges
in other cities, were denied the resources needed to play a similar role in
Lille.
Small commodity production and the municipal welfare system were
of central importance to Lille’s stability. Taken together, they channeled
the growth of the light-textile industry to the advantage of a large group
of petty masters with a firm stake in the developing social and economic
structure. They also curbed the potentially destabilizing emergence of
either a polarized class structure or intractable material grievances. Be
cause, moreover, the municipal ruling class dominated corporate and
charitable institutions and repeatedly intervened in the urban social
economy, artisan interests were shaped by and mediated through the
political elite. Hence ideas and practices that questioned the existing
order not only lacked a viable social base but faced the hostility of both
the great majority of artisans and the ruling group. Innovation could
therefore be stigmatized as economically unjustified, socially disruptive,
and morally indefensible.
At the same time that the structures of Lille’s economy hindered the
growth of an oppositional identity among urban masters, they also di
vided key groups of artisans in the city from their counterparts in the
countryside. The social and economic experiences of textile artisans in
Lille differed sharply from those of their counterparts in villages.
Whereas urban weavers operated within the small commodity system,
rural producers were much more likely to be dependent wage earners,
typically employed in some sort of putting-out arrangement. In addition,
a shared antagonism toward the development of rural textiles bound
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together ruling class and artisans in the city. The large body of urban
weavers in particular objected to the emergence of competition in the
countryside. After all, they benefited from the existing asymmetrical
regional division of labor that assigned less remunerative preparatory
work to rural areas, while reserving more lucrative jobs to the city. Not
surprisingly, then, the urban monopolies that underlay this unequal dis
tribution of tasks joined the interests of Magistrat and craftsman.
Besides foreclosing the emergence of autonomous artisan con
sciousness, organization, and mobilization within Lille and on a regional
basis, small commodity production and the Common Fund also re
stricted the urban audience for Protestantism. They perpetuated viable
corporate and civic institutions and ideology on the one hand, and they
minimized change and hardship on the other. To be sure, an organized
Reformed community did arise in sixteenth-century Lille, and local
threats combined with opportunities created by national and regional
incidents to stimulate some mobilization. But Lille’s Protestants were
unable to profit even when a broad political, religious, social, and eco
nomic crisis enveloped the Netherlands. Once their merchant element
withdrew or fell silent, the Reformed were cut off from any access to
urban political resources that might have eased the repression visited
upon them.
Finally, Lille’s social and economic structures discouraged rural and
urban dissenters from forging strong common interests and viable coali
tions. As it evolved, of course, the Protestant movement emphasized
cooperation among fellow believers no matter where their place of resi
dence. What is more. Reformed religion took root most firmly in the
rural cloth communities of northern Walloon Flanders. Yet the continu
ing development of small commodity relations of production and welfare
services meant that the life experiences of most Lillois remained conso
nant with the beliefs and practices of the traditional faith. So during the
summer of 1566, when Reformers were pulling down the symbols of the
old church and raising the new throughout Walloon Flanders, “the
common people” {la commune) of Lille were “very agitated” about re
ligion, the Magistrat reported.^ But their activities were designed to stop
heretics, not assist them.
3 Response to Toumai’s Protestants, printed in Verheyden, “Chronique de Gaiffier,” pp. 81-2.
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Over the long term, sustained economic- growth provided a favorable
environment for stability. As we have Seen, however, it was the magis
trates who enacted the arrangements that hobbled the emergence and
mobilization of contending groups and then uniformly and effectively
crushed any that managed to appear. There were a number of reasons
why Lille’s ruling class was able to intervene decisively over many tu
multuous decades and indeed to redouble its efforts as the economic
cycle became more erratic, inflation more pressing, and Protestant agi
tation more extensive after midcentury. To begin with, the city’s political
and economic elites overlapped considerably, the result of homogeneous
social composition enhanced by intermarriage and dense networks of
business relationships. The cohesion of the magistracy was further
strengthened by rotation in office and the constitution of an informal
inner circle, both of which encouraged unity founded on a community of
interests as well as long acquaintanceship. In addition, the formation of
factions that might have entered alliances with challengers from outside
the government was discouraged by the absence of an entrenched pa
triciate and the consequent newness of the ruling class. Like the mer
chant class that provided the bulk of its members, Lille’s governing
group remained open to those who acquired the proper social and eco
nomic credentials. At the same time, the frustration of artisan en
trepreneurial efforts removed the possibility that a wealthy and strategic
group might emerge to contest not merely specific policies but the entire
distribution of political power that bred them.
Conversely, the lack of corporate participation in city government
meant that artisans had no political space of their own in which they
might have formulated and enunciated demands distinct from, and per
haps in conflict with, those of the governing elite. Thus when direct
challenges to the Magistrat were voiced in the late 1570s, they evoked
no response within this solidary ruling class or for that matter among any
other organized group of townspeople, save, on one occasion, some
militia officers. In this instance, moreover, the fact that the municipal
government rather than guilds or some other body controlled the civic
companies allowed the authorities to nip the protest in the bud and
regain the initiative. So lacking any politically significant resources such as divisions among the authorities, allies for a coalition, or armed
force - the contenders were quickly isolated and defeated. Even the
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Estates-General, to whom the insurgents appealed for aid, quickly rec
ognized that the balance of power overwhelmingly favored the estab
lished authorities.
The municipal government could also act effectively because its
members remained closely attuned to urban society. On the one hand,
very few of the merchants who dominated the Magistrat abandoned
trade. On the other, aldermen and councillors - many of them drawn
from the inner circle of the ruling class - sat on the bodies administering
the textile crafts and the Bourse commune, where they learned at first
hand about important issues. Probably it was this experience that made a
merchant-controlled municipal government willing not merely to coun
tenance but to construct and enforce small commodity production, sac
rificing probable economic gain for social and political purposes. In
turn, successful measures legitimated the Magistrat’s rule while extend
ing its control.
The same features that promoted the Loi’s cohesion and secured its
local hegemony likewise permitted it to retain a substantial degree of
autonomy from successive central governments. The Magistrat was not
a policy innovator and indeed usually sought to work with the regime in
power, particularly in order to secure or extend economic and jurisdic
tional benefits. At the same time, however, it is clear that Lille’s magis
trates were consistently and firmly resolved to defend municipal privi
leges, the established faith, and their own authority, and would resist
central-state measures that threatened any of these. These commit
ments explain not only their stubborn resistance to confiscation and
rejection of the Tenth and Twentieth Pennies, but also their eventual
break with the Estates-General.
On occasion, of course, the Magistrat did face challenges, whether
from would-be entrepreneurs, Protestants, or Zealots. But in conse
quence of arrangements implemented largely by the ruling class, con
tenders never managed to assemble the resources needed to mobilize
successfully and capitalize on dissidence. Only intervention from the
outside promised any real breakthrough for the proponents of collective
action for change in sixteenth-century Lille. Yet in the absence of any
viable popular movement within the city, such attempts were doomed to
rapid failure. In fact, as the popular vigilantism of summer 1566 inti
mated, and the crowds that greeted insurgent initiatives in 1578 strik
ingly demonstrated, it was the ruling class, not a rebellion, Aat could
312

Stability in revolution
summon citizens into the streets and squares of Lille to enforce its
program.
II
Lille’s magistrates were scarcely the only ones who actively sought the
stability that would preserve their rule and what they construed as their
city’s best interests. But to judge by the available studies - which to be
sure have focused on towns where some sort of significant collective
action did occur - the environment accounting for Lille’s situation was
rarely matched. The scholarly literature reveals the existence of two
groups of towns, which may be called revolutionary centers and coup
cities. Each exhibited a different pattern of interaction among material
conditions, social and economic structure, religious ferment, political
institutions, and magisterial conduct, and each was subject to distinct
forms of mobilization for collective action.
Revolutionary centers lay mainly in the southern provinces of the
Netherlands. Here broadly based, prolonged collective action effected
political and/or religibus change for a significant period of time, though
never permanently Among these centers were to be found the major
light-cloth towns - apart from Lille. But it was the great cities of Bra
bant, notably Antwerp and Brussels, as well as Ghent in Flanders, that
saw the most sustained and far-reaching revolutionary developments."^
With the partial exception of Ghent, these towns underwent rapid
economic growth across the early sixteenth century. In all of them, too,
the long period of expansion terminated soon after midcentury in a
decade or more of stagnation ending in harsh crises. But if their eco
nomic and material histories resembled Lille’s in these respects, the
absence of viable protective structures or adequate ameliorative and
regulative institutions crucially distinguished them. Ghent was further
^ The following draws on Hocquet, Toumai et le Toumaisis au XVIe siecle; Paul Rolland, Histoire de
Toumai (Tournai and Paris, 1957); Histoire de Valenciennes, ed. Henri Platelle (Lille, 1982); Clark,
“An Urban Study during the Revolt of the Netherlands”; Van der Wee, Rise ofthe Antwerp Market;
Idem, “The Economy as a Factor in the Start of the
Antwerpen in deXVIde eeuw; Hugo
Soly, “Nijverheid en kapitalisme te Antwerpen in de i6de eeuw,” in Album Charles Verlinden
(Ghent, 1975); idem, “Economische vernieuwing en sociale weerstand. De betekenis en aspiraties der Antwerpse middenklasse in de i6de eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 83 (1970)152035; idem, Urbanisme en Kapitalisme te Antwerpen in de 16de eeuw (Brussels, 1977); Histoire de
Bruxelles, ed. Mina Martens (Toulouse, 1979); Alexandre Henne and Alphonse Wauters, Histoire
de Bruxelles, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1845); Hans Van Werveke, Gand, esquisse d’histoire sociale (Brussels,
1946); Victor Fris, Histoire de Gand, 2nd ed. (Brussels, 1930).
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set apart by a combination of commercial growth - principally in grain
and linens - and industrial decline, strikingly evident in woolen drapery.
But in the social results of economic development, Ghent did resemble
the other revolutionary centers. A substantial middling artisanry sud
denly faced the end of its accustomed prosperity in the 1560s, while
impoverished wage earners became increasingly desperate. To be sure,
even in new and less regulated crafts most enterprises were small, and
even in Antwerp there is some evidence of support for masters’ demands
for safeguards against innovators.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the traditional social and economic
order was under attack. Particularly disturbing to those threatened hy
such developments, the magistracies typically failed to act or even took
the capitalists’ side. Complaints against entrepreneurs and authorities
alike began to stir artisans - already in 1554, riots in Antwerp revealed
deep dissatisfaction - and led them to countenance joint action with the
wage earners they normally despised.^
These processes of change and the grievances to which they gave rise
had the added result of making artisans and wage earners more receptive
to Protestantism, especially when religious dissenters offered charity that
municipalities were unable or unwilling to extend. The groupings thus
formed also found indispensable coalition partners among political con
tenders. The magistracies that held sway over these cities were closed
oligarchies consisting largely of rentiers, nobles, and professionals - a
social composition that may explain their unimaginative responses to
artisan concerns. What is more, the ruling strata were widely, if not always
accurately, perceived as doing the bidding of the central government to
the detriment of municipal privileges and finances.
Among those challenging the city governments were groups excluded
from decision making yet at the same time enjoying access to significant
institutional and coercive resources that fostered mobilization while
helping parry repression. In Brussels, for instance, both the patrician
lignages and the guild and citizen elite, grouped into nations, had had
5 Cf. the situation in the great West Flanders say-cloth center of Hondschoote. After coming to
dominate local government, from about 1540 merchant entrepreneurs were allowed both to
ignore previously enforced limits on loom ownership and to move in the direction of vertical
concentration by taking over several stages of production. All this helped generate animosity that
contributed to broad participation in iconoclastic riots. See Emile Coomaert, Un centre industriel
d'autrefois. La draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote (XlVe-XVIIIe siecles) (Rennes, 1930).
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their authority curbed by princely officials while nonetheless remaining
part of municipal government. The guilds at Antwerp, which had be
come increasingly conscious of their rising economic importance, were
strongly represented on the supervisory Broad and Monday Councils.
The Conseil particulier oiSdXtncitnnts, established in 1497 in response
to merchant complaints about the corruption of the Magistrat, con
ducted biweekly reviews of the aldermen’s activities, and it controlled
the civic militia. Named in principle by the sovereign, in practice the
members of the council were coopted and served repeatedly, endowing
the body with a great deal of unity and solidarity. At Tournai, the bannieres (organizations that included every guild as well as all other cit
izens), and at Ghent the “members” (three bodies dominated by guilds,
in particular the drap weavers) had within recent memory lost power to
paid oligarchies of the rich, appointed and closely supervised by the
central government. The corporate groups continued, however, to have
charge of the militia.
Under these conditions, central-government policies - preeminently
though not exclusively the persecution of Protestants - not only failed
utterly but laid bare fissures within the local political order that were
quickly exploited by insurgents. Common interests - largely defensive
though also, in the case of religious reformers, innovative in nature thus engendered organized groups that allied into mobilized coalitions.
Armed with strategic ideological, social, and material resources, these
alliances responded forcefully to threats and took full advantage of the
distinctive opportunities arising in each city. At the same time, however,
significant differences in constituency, goals, and resources existed
among the various partners in these coalitions. Over time, these diver
gences generated a process of radicalization, as each group attempted to
dominate the new regime. But they ended in internecine strife, mutual
exhaustion, and acceptance of Spanish rule, whether achieved by mili
tary defeat or by negotiation.
In coup cities, collective action to effect religious and/or political
change occurred but was less broadly based and intense than in the
revolutionary centers. Thus success came only with aid from outside.
Coups occurred principally during the second phase of revolt, when
Beggar assaults with the assistance of accomplices within took over
towns, most durably in Holland and Zeeland. But they also took place
315
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during the period of Estates-General rule, when exiled Protestants and
partisans of William of Orange patronized or provoked risings that they
then helped to carry through.^
Most cities that underwent coups were experiencing economic de
cline, considerably sharpened in the period just preceding the risings,
and this process caused bitter social tensions. Admittedly, in some towns
attempts had been made to establish new industries (Ypres, for example,
tried says and other light cloth), but most of these efforts had miscarried.
At Bruges, a recently created fustian industry initially met with success,
but after midcentury its output was characterized by substantial oscilla
tions superimposed on a stagnant or even downward trend. In order to
stimulate economic growth, moreover, urban authorities usually dis
mantled existing regulations that protected small producers or, as at
Douai, vacillated so much that in the end they managed to satisfy neither
masters nor entrepreneurs. Worse, none of the towns had adequate
welfare systems to cope with widespread downward mobility and im
poverishment. Clerical or corporate opposition derailed projects similar
to Lille’s Common Fund in several cities; continued economic decay
bankrupted reforms that had been implemented elsewhere. The result
ing misery provided Orangists and Protestants with a constituency and
an issue that they were not slow to exploit.
Exclusive, ingrown oligarchies, city magistracies were also perceived
as all too accommodating to central government pressures - notably, in
Holland and Zeeland at least, in regard to Alba’s taxes - even though
* The following discussion is based on J. C. Boogman, “De overgang van Gouda, Dordrecht,
Leiden en Delft in de zomer van het jaar 1572,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 57 (i942):8i-ii2; T.
S. Jansma, “De betekenis van Dordrecht en Rotterdam omstreeks het midden der zestiende
eeuw,” De Economist 92 (i943);2i2-5o; N. W. Posthumus, Geschiedenis van de Leidsche Lakenindustrie, 2 vols. in 3 parts (The Hague, 1908-39); P. J. Blok, Geschiedenis eener Hollandsche Stad, 4
vols. (The Hague, 1910-18) [on Leiden]; C. C. Hibben, Gouda in Revolt. Particularism and
Pacifism in the Revolt ofthe Netherlands 1572-1588 (Uxxtcht, 1983); DuPlessis, “Urban Stability in
the Netherlands Revolution” [on Douai]; J. A. Van Houtte, Bruges. Essai d’histoire urbaine
(Brussels, 1967); \Aem, De geschiedenis van Brugge fEitXt, 1982); J. Vermaut, “Structural Transfor
mation in a Textile Centre: Bruges from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in The Rise
and Decline of Urban Industries in Italy and in the Low Countries (Late Middle Ages - Early Modem
Times), ed. Herman Van der Wee (Leuven, 1988), pp. 187-205; J. De Mey, “De ‘mislukte’
anapassingen van de nieuwe draperie, de saainijverheid en de lichte draperie te leper,” Tijdschrift
voor geschiedenis 63 (i9So);222-35; Raymond Van Uytven, Stadsfinancien en Stadsekonomie te
Leuven van deXIIe tot het einde derXVIe eeuw (Brussels, 1961); OSexmam, Arbeid en Levensstandaard; Rudolf Kolman, De Reductie van Nijmegen (1591), voor- en naspel (Groningen, 1952);
Pirenne, ’s-Hertogenbosch; Decavele, Dageractd van de Reformatie. Cf. A. J. M. Beenakker, Breda in
de eerste storm van de opstand. Van Ketterij tot beeldenstorm 1545-1569 (Tilburg, 1971).
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they tended to drag their feet on the issue of persecuting heretics.
Corporations had no institutional presence in Holland and Zeeland
municipalities, although elsewhere they had some voice in town affairs.
But no matter what the reigning institutional arrangements, militias
were generally independent of the town government, even when not
under guild control, and they drew their membership largely from ar
tisans. Additionally, the civic companies began to take a keener interest
in their traditional role as guarantors of urban privileges now that mag
istracies were perceived to be laggard in this regard.
In coup towns, then, opposition groups had urgent dissatisfactions,
and resources existed that would facilitate collective action. But both
individually and even in coalition the contenders were too small in
number and too divided in interests to win on their own. Because many
artisans in these towns produced for local and regional markets, social
and economic change affected or threatened only a minority. Even in the
luxury drapery trades in the Flemish cities, in fact, corporations had
retained most of their traditional religious and social attributes as well as
protective rules, so new ideas and practices had made few inroads
among the artisans.
Hence outside aid was essential for challengers to prevail. It might
come from Beggars and exiles, as in Holland and Zeeland, from Ghent
Calvinists and revolutionaries, as in Flanders, or from the troops of the
Estates-General, as in Brabant. Hence, too, radical political experi
ments did not follow coups. Admittedly, many individual magistrates
were purged on grounds of religion or hostility to Orangism, but neither
the social composition nor the structure of the municipal regimes was
altered. It was the weaknesses of the city governments, and their reliance
on external support, that made successful coups possible; it was the
weaknesses of contenders, and their reliance on external force, that
limited the coups’ effects. Even in the northern towns, where a new state
and religious order were introduced, the dominant groups perpetuated
their hegemony by exchanging Habsburg for Orangist tutelage.
Amsterdam formed something of an exception to other coup centers
in that it had experienced rapid economic growth during the first twothirds of the sixteenth century.^ Yet the results of its development re’’ See A. J. M. Brouwer Ancher and Joh. C. Breen, “De Doleantie van een deel der burgerij van
Amsterdam tegen den Magistraat dier stad in 1564 en 1565,” Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het
Historisch Genootschap 24 (1902) 15 9-200; H. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam (Amster317
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sembled those prevailing in the other towns in which coups took place.
On the one side, traditional artisan crafts organized in guilds subordi
nate to and excluded from the city government remained dominant; on
the other, harbingers of structural change were beginning to appear in
some industrial sectors. In addition, during the 1560s opposition to the
long-entrenched, resolutely Catholic “Dirkist” oligarchy emerged in the
form of the “Doleanten” party. Resentful of their exclusion from the
seats of municipal power despite possessing comparable if not greater
wealth than the incumbents, the Doleanten also suspected the Dirkists
of failing adequately to protect the vitally important grain trade. Further,
the Doleanten found the current magistracy too subservient to Brussels’s
dictates on religious matters and insufficiently heedful of municipal
privileges.
To be sure, despite serious iconoclasm in 1566, and a near-revolt by
several thousand townspeople early the next year, the insurgent move
ment lacked sufficient common interests to prevail at the time. But a
decade of severe depression, which the Dirkists failed to manage satis
factorily, corroded loyalties to the point that the citizen militia refused to
defend the government during its final climacteric. Even then, however,
Amsterdam’s old regime retained substantial human, ideological, and
repressive resources, and it was only overthrown in 1578 thanks to
assistance provided by returning exiles.
Ill
Although well aware of the defensive aspects of the Dutch Revolt, Henri
Pirenne presented it as essentially progressive in nature, the clash of
protagonists pursuing forward-looking interests. He depicted a royal
government bent on centralizing and unifying a nation; capitalist classes
driven to overcome their alienation from the existing order through
political, social, religious, and ideological innovation; and a bold new
faith willing to employ novel forms of organization and discipline to
break sharply with established belief and practice. Scholars of collective
dam, 1911); J. E. Elias, Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamse Regentenpatriciaat (The Hague, 1923);!.
G. van Dillen, Amsterdam in 1585 (Amsterdam, 1941); Henk F. K. van Nierop, Beeldenstorm en
burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam 1566-1567 (Nijmegen, 1978); James D. Tracy, “A Premature
Counter-Reformation; The Dirkist Government of Amsterdam, i ssS-i
^umal ofReligious
History 13 (1984): 150-67.
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action, in contrast, maintain that much radical and even revolutionary
action occurs in order to prevent change, not to promote it.
The evidence presented in this book indicates that it was the interac
tion of both forward-looking and defensive forces that gave rise to the
Dutch Revolt, at least in the cities. Some central government policies,
most notably those directed toward building a more integrated state,
were innovatory. Yet the Habsburgs - like their Protestant adversaries clung stubbornly to the long-established belief that a single church must
enjoy a religious monopoly in their domains. On their side, many munic
ipal governments were devising new institutions or subordinating exist
ing ones, thereby enhancing their control over urban populations. Al
most without exception, however, they struggled to protect existing
rights and privileges against Brussels’s religious and financial policies.
Those that failed to do so faced a risky loss of legitimacy at home, if not
rebellion or even overthrow.
Again, it was neither the frustrated expectations nor the absolute
impoverishment of social classes newly generated by capitalist develop
ment that alone gave strength to urban protest in the Netherlands.
Rather, it was these in tandem with portents of structural change troub
ling small and medium producers at a time when steep inflation, market
instability, and insufficient ameliorative systems increased this pivotal
group’s vulnerability to entrepreneurial initiatives. What mattered was
less the presence of proletarians than the threat of proletarianization.
Finally, Protestant demands for and steps toward the open exercise of
their faith represented a break with rather than a continuation of the
status quo. Yet if some people may have harkened to the new message
because of unsettling changes in their work or social experiences, many
others found the Reformed religion appealing because it expressed their
fear of change. For their part, Protestants resembled not so much a mass
movement - or even a disciplined revolutionary vanguard - as a hetero
geneous alliance responding to a constantly shifting constellation of
threats and opportunities. In and of themselves, the Reformed contrib
uted to the outbreak of the revolt by exposing and exploiting weak points
in the political system and its repressive apparatus. But to succeed in
attaining their goals, even in part, Protestants had to form coalitions with
groups with an essentially reactive orientation.
This book also maintains that it was a combination of defensive and
forward-looking measures that permitted the achievement of stability in
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sixteenth-century Lille. Artisan mobilization was not inhibited because
the city fathers acquiesced in extensive innovation or because they at
tempted to maintain a static social order. Instead, it was blocked because
the Magistrat had recourse to selective adaptation, psychological as well
as material. More generally, this book claims that while powerful eco
nomic, social, and religious currents created the potential for revolt in
the mid-sixteenth-century Netherlands, it was the political response of
the local ruling class that determined whether such an outcome would in
fact be realized. As the example of Lille shows, even an oligarchic
magistracy pursuing the repressive policy favored by an increasingly
unpopular central government could stay firmly in control. What it had
to do - and what few other urban governments apparently managed to
accomplish - was at once resolutely to address the perceived sources of
discontent and to tighten controls over the populace.
Lille’s ruling class did not make its history entirely, or even largely,
under conditions of its own choosing. The city’s economic groAvth was and this became painfully obvious during recurrent crises - dependent
on conditions within a competitive international market over which its
people, even its greatest merchants, had very little control. Similarly, the
diffusion of religious dissent was a function of commercial routes, tech
nological developments, and cultural evolution that the Magistrat could
not interrupt. Even such favorable factors as electoral procedures or the
recent formation of the urban political class were legacies that the Loi
could turn to its benefit but had not created. What Lille’s political
leadership must be credited with is the ability to recognize that it could
reproduce both stability and its own hegemony through discriminating
intervention, particularly in social and economic affairs, that balanced
economic considerations with broadly based cultural traditions and
ideological commitments.
In the literature on the Dutch Revolt - indeed, in the scholarship on
revolution as a whole - Lille thus continues to stand out as singular, a
stark contrast to the centers of iconoclasm, resistance, and rebellion that
have understandably received most attention. But its example suggests
the advisability of studying locations where mobilization was checked,
insurgency contained, and collective action blocked, if we wish to under
stand both revolution and its counterpart stability.
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